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I. INTRODUCTION
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), enacted in 1977,1
signaled a major philosophical shift in the United States regarding the
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1 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (1977) (amended
1988, 1998) [herein FCPA].
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acceptability of the common business practice of bribing foreign offi-
cials. Nonetheless, the reality of such business dealings worldwide did
not change until very recently,2 when the consequences of ignoring the
law became subject to enormous fines levied by the Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ).3  No doubt, the FCPA has inspired international efforts to
eradicate corruption, national efforts to enshrine anti-bribery concepts
in law, and serious efforts to enforce those laws. The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention4 and the
recent U.K. Anti-Bribery law5 reflect this trend, albeit with mixed suc-
cess. Not surprisingly, many observers have remained cynical and
doubt whether countries with an entrenched culture of corruption
would ever change. This article examines Brazil’s surprising decision
to enact its Clean Companies Law,6 thereby ending the country’s offi-
cial tolerance of corruption and adding its name to the short list of
countries that have taken major steps to change the business culture.
It looks at this through the lens of the pharmaceutical industry, con-
sidering the preliminary groundwork for the law as established
through industry and country codes. Finally this article concludes with
some assessments of the efficacy of these efforts and recommendations
for regulatory changes.
2 Cf. SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA Digest: Recent Trends and Patterns in the
Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, in THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRAC-
TICES ACT AND INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION DEVELOPMENTS 2013 (2013),
available at http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/Services/FCPA/2014/FCPA
DigestTPFCPA010614.pdf (showing the statistics and the dramatic increase in
cases and fines).
3 Id.
4 OECD, CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/
daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf.
5 Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 § 7 (Eng.).
6 Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIA´RIO OFICIAL DA UNIA˜O [D.O.U.] de
7.8.2013 (Braz.). An English translation of the law is available at http://www.cov
.com/files/upload/E-Alert_ Attachment _ Brazilian_Clean_Companies_Act_English
.pdf. In 2012, Mexico also passed its own anti-corruption law. See Alison Tanchyk
et al., Mexico Enacts Anti-Corruption Law for Federal Government Contracting,
MORGAN LEWIS, Oct. 12, 2012, http://www.morganlewis.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/
publication.detail/publicationID/ba98cb6e-5be8-42b0-b495-4255dd0f28f5 (discuss-
ing law which took effect June 12, 2012 and “. . . holds individuals and companies
accountable for offering money or gifts to obtain or maintain a business advantage
in the procurement of public contracts . . .”).
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II. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
Passing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the United States
in 1977 was the bold act of a legislature not known for such activism
for over a decade.7 In retrospect, it is interesting that neither gridlock
nor partisan bickering obstructed this dramatic move. The statute
criminalized the offering of something of value to a foreign official to
obtain or retain business.8 It also required maintaining adequate
books and records so failure to record a bribe could be actionable.9 No
doubt, many expected other countries to follow suit and were disap-
pointed: the community of nations not only failed to embrace this new
view, many countries continued to condone the practice by allowing
tax deductions for bribes.10
A. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The 1977 law required issuers of securities defined by the law11
to “make and keep books, records, and accounts, accurately and fairly
reflect the transactions . . .” as well as “. . . devise and maintain a
system of internal accounting controls . . .”12 The standard was “rea-
sonable detail” and “reasonable assurances.”13 Furthermore, Section 5
imposed a knowing standard: “No person shall knowingly circumvent
or knowingly fail to implement a system of internal accounting con-
trols or knowingly falsify . . .”14 This was an addition in 1988 and re-
placed the earlier “reason to know” standard.15 “Reason to know” was
too vague and made business people uncomfortable with what might
be imputed to them, whereas the knowing standard was more consis-
tent with criminal standards.16
7 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1. Perhaps not since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was there
such an attempt to change the culture of business and society.
8 Id.
9 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2012).
10 See generally Walter Perkel, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 40 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 683, 704 (2003) (discussing tax deductibility).
11 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2).
12 Id. at § 78m(b)(2)(A)–(B).
13 Id.; see also id. at § 78m(b)(7).
14 Id. § 78m(b)(5).
15 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(4)–(7)
(1988) [hereinafter FCPAA 1988]. For discussion, see generally Beverley H. Earle,
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments: The Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act’s Focus on Improving Investment Opportunities, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 549
(1989) (discussing the impact of the 1988 amendments).
16 Statute requires both “corrupt” and willful intent for an individual. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-1 states
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Another section of the law makes it unlawful for an issuer of
securities or domestic concern or
any person . . . or officer, director, employee, or agent of
such person . . . [to]. . . corruptly [ ] make use of the mails
or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce
or to do any other act in furtherance of an offer, payment,
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any
money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of
the payment . . . of anything of value to—
(1) any foreign official for purposes of—
(A)
(i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official
in his official capacity,
(ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any
act . . . , or
(iii) securing any improper advantage; or
(B) Inducing such foreign official to use his influence . . .
in order to assist such person in obtaining or retaining
business for or with, or directing business to, any
person.17
The statute also restricts influencing foreign political parties or
candidates.18
The original FCPA included an exemption for functions that
were “ministerial or clerical.”19 However, the 1988 version dropped
that exemption for the clearer exemption of “routine governmental ac-
tion,” which it defined as what could be “ordinarily and commonly per-
formed.”20 A subsequent section clarifies that the law does not include
specific actions connected to the decision making process “to award
new business to or continue business with a particular party.”21
Any officer, director or employee or agent of an issuer, or stock-
holder acting on behalf of such issuer, who willfully violates sub-
section (a) or (g) of section 78dd-f of the title shall be fined not
more than $100,000 or imprisoned not more than 5 years or both.
For discussion, see generally Don Zarin, The Foreign Payments Provisions, DOING
BUSINESS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT §§4–8, at 36 (2d ed. 2013).
17 FCPA, supra note 1, at §§ 78dd–3(a) (2012).
18 Id. at § 78dd–3(a)(2).
19 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 30A, 91 Stat. 1494
(1977) (prior to 1988 amendments).
20 FCPA, supra note 1, at §§ 78dd–1(b)&(f)(3)(A) (2012) (listing obtaining permits
or official documents allowing a person to do business in a foreign country,
processing visas and work orders, police protection, inspections, phone service,
loading and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable commodities or actions of a
similar nature, as examples of ordinarily and commonly performed work).
21 Id. at § 78dd–1(f)(3)(B).
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The Affirmative Defense sections allow a defense if the bribe
was lawful in the country or it was a “reasonable and bona fide expen-
diture” including travel, promotion, or demonstration.22 A number of
Department of Justice Opinions address the issue of whether under-
writing travel for foreign officials and otherwise incurring expenses
while promoting business relations constitute violations of the
FCPA.23
The statute has endured despite suggestions it hampered the
United States’ business interests overseas.24
B. OECD
Moral persuasion did not appear to be much of an incentive for
countries to revise their laws in the years after 1977.25 However, two
decades later, economic arguments began to grab the attention of the
world community.26 The adverse impact of corruption on economic de-
velopment became a topic of international conversation; outrage grew
with respect to the common practice subverting economic assistance
and development projects into mere camouflage for bribes. The OECD
drafted a Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Offi-
cials in International Business Transactions in 1997, which became
effective in 1999.27 The Convention requires countries to have legisla-
tion that meets the standards in the Convention. The FCPA serves
this purpose for the United States, and the U.S. ratified the Conven-
tion in 1998. The OECD has been instrumental in keeping interna-
22 Id. at § 78dd–1(c).
23 Beverley Earle & Anita Cava, When is a Bribe Not a Bribe? A Re-Examination
of the FCPA in Light of Business Reality, 23 IND. INTL. & COMP. L. REV. 111,
128–29 (analyzing Opinion Releases).
24 See, e.g., id. at 146.
25 See Beverley Earle, The United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the
OECD Anti-Bribery Recommendation: When Moral Suasion Won’t Work, Try the
Money Argument, 14 DICK. J. INT. L 207, 207–09 (1996) (discussing the “shift from
a moral to an economic argument”). See generally Beverley Earle & Anita Cava,
Are Anti-Corruption Efforts Paying Off? International and National Measures in
the Asia-Pacific Region and Their Impact on India and Multinational Corpora-
tions, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 59 (2008) (discussing history of multidisciplinary analy-
sis of bribes); JOHN T. NOONAN, BRIBES (1984) (tracing the history of bribes
throughout the centuries); and SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN
POLITICAL ECONOMY (1978) (discussing groundbreaking work on the study of cor-
ruption from economic viewpoint).
26 Bribonomics, ECONOMIST, March 19, 1994, at 86, available at http://search.pro
quest.com/printviewfile?accountid=14731 (citing Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q. J. ECON. 599 (1993)).
27 OECD, supra note 4.
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tional attention on this issue and monitoring signatory countries for
compliance.
The OECD monitors compliance by countries, and the report-
ing maintains pressure.28 However, one of the major pressures on
countries to comply comes from the internet.29 This has reshaped the
way information is shared and can bring additional pressure outside of
both the electoral or normal enforcement process.
C. United Kingdom Bribery Act (UKBA)
The UKBA was adopted with fanfare in 2010, implemented in
2011, and touted as the “FCPA on steroids” because of its broader
reach in terms of covering “private bribery,” which encompasses bribes
between private businessmen.30 The UKBA covers any entity or per-
son who does business in the U.K.—even if the acts took place outside
the U.K.—and has a zero tolerance policy for facilitation payments,
contrary to the FCPA.31 The statute includes an “adequate procedures
defense,” which suggests that a good compliance program is going to
allow a company to remain in good stead even if a rogue employee
takes unauthorized action in violation of the law.32
The Ministry of Justice issued Guidance to clarify some of the
ambiguity.33 However, there still is confusion about when promotional
and entertainment expenses cross the line and become bribes. In De-
cember 2012, David Green, the head of the Serious Fraud Office, clari-
28 See What We Do and How, OECD.ORG, http://www.oecd.org/about/whatwedo
andhow (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
29 See Beverley Earle, Bribery and Corruption in Eastern Europe, the Baltic
States, and the Commonwealth of Independent States: What is to Be Done?, 33
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 483, 511 (2000) (suggesting technology will help expose corrup-
tion and thus deter it); Steven R. Salbu, Information Technology in the War
Against International Bribery and Corruption: The Next Frontier of Institutional
Reform, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 67, 90 (2001) (discussing the power of technology
and the internet to aid in exposing corruption).
30 See Nathan Koppel, Introducing the New “FCPA on Steroids,” WALL ST. J. L.
BLOG (Dec. 28, 2010, 2:12 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/12/28/introducing-
the-new-fcpa-on-steroids.
31 Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 3 (Eng.); see also Geoffrey Gauci & Jessica Fisher,
The UK Bribery Act and the US FCPA: The Key Differences, ASS’N. CORP. COUNSEL
(Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.acc.com/legalresources/quickcounsel/ukbafcpa.cfm#
BEFP.
32 Bribery Act, supra note 5, at § 7(2).
33 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010: GUIDANCE ABOUT PROCEDURES
WHICH RELEVANT COMMERCIAL ORGANISATIONS CAN PUT INTO PLACE TO PREVENT
PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH THEM FROM BRIBING (2011) (U.K.), https://www.justice.
gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf [hereinafter
Guidance].
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fied the illegality of facilitation payments.34 One group noted, “Where
once enforcement of the U.K. Bribery Act seemed a paper tiger, we
now see active prosecutions.”35
D. Other
The philosophical shift in attitudes regarding bribing foreign
officials — at least publically — is reflected in the drumbeat of organi-
zations adopting anti-bribery agreements ten years after the FCPA.
For example, the Organization of American States (OAS) enacted the
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption in 1996.36 This re-
quired nations to criminalize bribery.37 It went into force in 1997, al-
though the United States did not ratify until 2000.38 Interestingly, the
Convention has a section addressing and prohibiting the “illicit enrich-
ment” of officials.39 The section focuses on the personal profit that for-
eign officials routinely used their offices to secure. Public opinion is
increasingly intolerant of such excess.40
The United Nations Convention Against Corruption was en-
acted in 2003 and entered into force in 2005.41 A major aspect of the
Convention is the requirement that countries have laws criminalizing
many of the bribery offenses.42 As of November 29, 2013, 140 countries
34 Barry & Richard, An Open Letter from SFO David Green on Facilitation Pay-
ments You Don’t Know About, http://thebriberyact.com/2013/08/22/an-open-letter-
from-sfo-director-david-green-on-facilitation-payments-that-you-dont-kn (re-
printing David Green’s Dec. 6, 2012 letter reiterating no tolerance for facilitation
payments in contrast to previous head’s assurance of reasonableness).
35 Kevin T. Abikoff et al., United States: FCPA/Anti-Bribery Alert Winter - 2013,
MONDAQ (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/284740/White+Col
lar+Crime+Fraud/FCPAAntiBribery+Alert+Winter+2013 (Hughes Hubbard &
Reed LLP commenting on global enforcement trends).
36 Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention against Corrup-
tion, Mar. 29, 1996, O.A.S.T.S. No. B-58 [hereinafter IACAC].
37 Id. at art. VII.
38 See IACAC, supra note 36.
39 IACAC, supra note 36, at art. IX.
40 LINDY MUZILA ET AL., ON THE TAKE: CRIMINALIZING ILLICIT ENRICHMENT TO
FIGHT CORRUPTION, 1, 7–9 (The World Bank 2012), available at https://www.unodc
.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2012/On_the_Take-_Criminalizing_Illicit_
Enrichment_to_Fight_Corruption.pdf (discussing the development of the offense
over time).
41 United Nations Convention against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S.
41, available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/
Convention/08-50026_E.pdf.
42 Id. at arts. 15–28.
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signed on to the Convention.43 The number of signatories only broad-
ens the base of consensus that countries and their citizens will no
longer tolerate unofficial pillaging by their elected officials.
The World Bank’s efforts have also increased attention to the
issue of bribery by the announcement in 2012 of Strengthening Gov-
ernance, Tackling Corruption: The World Bank Group’s Updated Strat-
egy and Implementation Plan.44 They have instituted Procurement
Guidelines and have debarred firms for violations.45
Other groups, including the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank,
the Council of Europe, the African Union, and the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank, have also adopted rules and/or policies to penalize
bribing officials while conducting business.46 This unity in condemn-
ing bribery and in tightening the noose of prohibition serves to send
notice to business people who previously scoffed at the new-found seri-
ousness towards rooting out this ancient evil.47
43 U.N.D.O.C., United Nations Convention against Corruption: Signature and
Ratification Status as of 29 November 2013, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/trea-
ties/CAC/signatories.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
44 WORLD BANK, Strengthening Governance, Tackling Corruption: The World
Bank Group’s Updated Strategy and Implementation Plan, (Mar. 6, 2012), availa-
ble at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSEC
TORANDGOVERNANCE/0,,contentMDK:23086675~pagePK:210058~piPK:2100
62~theSitePK:286305,00.html.
45 Don Zarin, Multilateral Efforts Concerning Transnational Bribery of Foreign
Officials, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 13-11 (2d
ed. 2013) (noting that “over 607 individuals and firms . . . have been debarred or
cross-debarred).
46 See INT’L MONETARY FUND, THE IMF AND GOOD GOVERNANCE FACTSHEET, (Mar.
18, 2014), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/gov.pdf; Integrity and Anti-
Corruption, AFRICAN DEV. BANK GRP., http://www.afdb.org/en/about-us/structure/
integrity-and-anti-corruption (last visited Apr. 2, 2014); Fighting Fraud and Cor-
ruption in ADB Projects, Asian Dev. Bank, http://www.adb.org /site/integrity/main
(last visited Apr. 2, 2014); Action against Economic Crime, COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/default_en.asp
(last visited Apr. 2, 2014); African Union Convention on Preventing and Combat-
ing Corruption, July 11, 2003, available at http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/
AFRICAN_UNION_CONVENTION_PREVENTING_COMBATING_CORRUP
TION.pdf; Institutional Integrity, INTER-AM. DEV. BANK, http://www.iadb.org/en/
topics/transparency/integrity-at-the-idb-group/institutional-integrity,1291.html
(last visited Apr. 2, 2014).
47 See NOONAN, supra note 25 (tracing the history of bribes throughout the
centuries).
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E. NGOs
Two NGOs are particularly important in the fight against cor-
ruption. First, Transparency International (“TI”), founded in 1993,
states that its goal is “[a] world in which government, politics, busi-
ness, civil society and the daily lives of people are free of corruption.”48
Its logo is an eye with the globe as the eyeball, symbolic of the world
watching and the idea that transparency will help end the entrenched
practice of corruption and bribery.49 TI uses surveys of Bribe Payers
Index and Corruptions Perception Index to look at which countries are
most likely to offer bribes and in which countries one may be most
likely to be approached for bribes.50 Such surveys capture the phenom-
enon that although a country may have a relatively low tolerance for
bribery within its borders, its business people are apt to resort to brib-
ery when outside its borders.51 TI engages in research and strategies
to engage civil society and find ways to combat corruption.52
Another NGO, TRACE International, founded in 2001, helps
support corporate compliance.53
TRACE International and TRACE Incorporated are dis-
tinct entities with a shared mission to increase commer-
cial transparency for multinational companies and their
commercial intermediaries by raising the standard of
anti-bribery compliance.  TRACE International is a non-
profit membership organization that pools resources to
provide members with anti-bribery compliance support,
while TRACE Incorporated offers both members and
non-members customizable risk-based due diligence, a
comprehensive training package, and consulting ser-
48 Who We Are, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/whoweare (last
visited Mar. 31, 2014).
49 Id. (referring to the graphic on the website).
50 Bribe Payers Index, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/re
search/bpi (last visited Mar. 31, 2014); Corruption Perceptions Index, TRANS-
PARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi (last visited Mar. 31,
2014).
51 Bribe Payers Index, supra note 50; Corruption Perceptions Index, supra note 50.
The Bribe Payers Index and Corruption Perceptions Index demonstrate that this
is a two-part problem viewed from the perspective of both the briber and the
bribee.
52 See, e.g., Kareem Fahim, Slap to a Man’s Pride Set off Tumult in Tunisia, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/world/africa/22sidi.html
?pagewanted=all&_r=0, (discussing the impact of the fruit vendor in Tunisia who
set himself on fire Dec. 17, 2010 because of his harassment for bribes and how
protests led to the end of the 23-year term of the dictator/president).
53 About TRACE, TRACE, http://www.traceinternational.org/Trace.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 31, 2014).
35295-rgl_13-3 Sheet No. 9 Side B      09/09/2014   14:33:00
35295-rgl_13-3 Sheet No. 9 Side B      09/09/2014   14:33:00
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\13-3\RGL301.txt unknown Seq: 10 27-AUG-14 13:23
448 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 13:3
vices.  Working together, TRACE International and
TRACE Incorporated offer one complete, cost-effective,
and practical solution for anti-bribery and third party
compliance.54
ABOUT TRACE INTERNATIONAL
TRACE International was founded in 2001 by in-house
anti-bribery compliance experts to achieve economies of
scale and to set a common standard for two shared ele-
ments of anti-bribery compliance programs: due dili-
gence reviews of commercial intermediaries and anti-
bribery training for the global supply chain.  TRACE In-
ternational is a 501c (6) non-profit business association
that leverages a shared-cost model to provide practical
and cost-effective anti-bribery compliance services for
multinational companies and their commercial in-
termediaries through a membership program.55
Although confusing because both have TI as acronyms, their
functions are quite different., as the latter is an organization support-
ing compliance efforts and furthering industry education. While com-
panies that compete do not collaborate in this arena, if competitors are
united in complying with anti-bribery laws, all companies benefit.
Companies pay dues to support the organization.56
This brief explanation of developments that occurred post-1977
shows the remarkable expansion globally of a common understanding
of the economic consequences of bribery and a collective will expressed
through law to change this practice.57
III. THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
As defined by the legal landscape outlined above, corruption in
the pharmaceutical industry manifests itself in the manufacturing,
promotion, and marketing of prescription drugs and medical devices
writ large.58 Focusing specifically on the role of physicians in this pro-
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Portable Due Diligence, TRACE, http://traceinternational.org/Diligence/
portable-due-diligence.html, (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
57 SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1978).
58 Mark A. Rodwin, Symposium, Institutional Corruption and the Pharmaceutical
Policy, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 544 (2013)
Today, the goals of pharmaceutical policy and medical practice
are often undermined due to institutional corruption — that is,
widespread or systemic practices, usually legal, that undermine
an institution’s objectives or integrity . . .. [T]he pharmaceutical
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cess, a major issue is that in many countries around the world—and
especially in Latin America—doctors are employed by the government
in some capacity.  Accordingly, they function as public officials and are
subject to the reach of anti-bribery legislation when they prescribe or
make recommendations for adoption of specific pharmaceutical goods
and services.59 As a result, the pharmaceutical industry has been
under special scrutiny for influencing such decisions through gifts,
hospitality, luxurious travel under the guise of educational opportuni-
ties or familiarization trips, and similar benefits offered to health care
providers.60  The legal enforcement environment has been buttressed
by industry efforts to police itself at every level—global, regional, and
national—by adopting codes of conduct or ethics.61  This is certainly
true in Brazil.
industry’s own purposes are often undermined.  Moreover, cer-
tain practices have corrupted medical research, the production of
medical knowledge, the practice of medicine, drug safety, and the
Food and Drug Administration’s oversight of pharmaceutical
marketing.;
See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Stryker Corporation with FCPA Violations
(Oct. 24, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRe
lease/1370540044262#.U0v9e8e7 n1U for a review of corruption in Latin America
and the enforcement activity against pharmaceutical companies for improper de-
velopment, promotion and sales reveals staggering sums assessed in fines. In
2013, Stryker was fined more than $13.2 million for improper bribes in five coun-
tries, including Mexico and Argentina. In a review of FCPA enforcement actions in
Latin America in 2012, three of the six major defendants were pharmaceutical
companies that were fined a total of $59.9 million (Biomet: $22.8 million; Orthofix:
$7.7 million; Eli Lilly: $29.4 million). See also Matt Ellis, FCPA in Latin America:
2012 in Review, LACCAnet (Feb. 15, 2013), available at http://www.millercheval
ier.com/portalresource/lookup/poid/Z1tOl9NPl0LTYnMQZ56TfzcRVPMQiLsSwap
Dm83!/document.name=/FCPA%20in%20Latin%20America.pdf.
59 See, e.g., When is a Bribe Not a Bribe?, supra note 23, at 134–35, n.102 (2013)
(citing Lanny A. Breuer, Prepared Keynote Address to the Tenth Annual Pharma-
ceutical Regulatory and Compliance Congress and Best Practices Forum (2009),
http://www.ehcca.com/presentations/pharmacongress10/breuer_2.pdf).
60 See Breuer, supra note 59, at 2 (“The depth of government involvement in for-
eign health systems, combined with fierce industry competition and the closed na-
ture of many public formularies, creates a significant risk that corrupt payments
will infect the process. The Criminal Division stands ready to ferret out this illegal
conduct and we are uniquely situated to do so.”).
61 Jeffrey Francer et al., Ethical Pharmaceutical Promotion and Communications
Worldwide: Codes and Regulations, PHIL. ETHICS & HUMAN. IN MED. 7 (2014),
available at http://www.peh-med.com/content/pdf/1747-5341-9-7.pdf  (offering ta-
bles summarizing the many strands of industry self-regulatory organizations); see
also GlaxoSmithKline’s (GSK) helpful inventory of all pharmaceutical, vaccine,
and consumer product trade associations in existence in 2013, organized by global,
regional, and country status. Main Pharmaceutical, Vaccine and Consumer Prod-
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A. Industry Codes
Throughout Latin America, the medical establishment has
long worked with the pharmaceutical industry to create robust codes
of conduct.  The Argentine Chamber of Medical Specialities (CAEMe)
is credited with launching the first such effort in 1925,62  while the
respected Latin American regional industry organization, the Federa-
tion of Pharmaceutical Industries (FIFARMA), organized itself in
1962.63  Today, the pharmaceutical industries in many countries in the
region have agreed to governance by the principles put forward by the
European-based International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufac-
turers and Associations (IFPMA), widely viewed to be the gold stan-
dard.64  The IFPMA Code of Practice, which was adopted in 1981 and
significantly updated in 2012,65 has been explicitly embraced by the
uct Trade Associations – 2013, GLAXOSMITHKLINE (2014), http://www.gsk.com/con
tent/dam/gsk/globals/documents/pdf/corporateresponsibility/cr-report-2012/trade-
association-memberships.pdf.
62 ¿Que´ es CAEMe?, CAEME, http://www.caeme.org.ar/nosotros.php (last visited
Apr. 1, 2014) (English translation available at http://translate.google.com/trans
late?hl=en&sl=es&u= http://www.caeme.org.ar/&prev=/search%3Fq%3Dcaeme%2
Bargentina%26client%3Dfirefox-a%26hs%3DNjC%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:en-US:
official%26channel%3Dsb%26biw%3D1366%26bih%3D640); Interview with Er-
nesto Felicio, Executive Director of CAEMe and Executive Vice President of
FIFARMA, CAEMe, PHARMABOARDROOM (Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.pharma
boardroom.com/article/interview-with-ernesto-felicio-executive-director-of-caeme-
and-executive-vice-president-of-fifarma-c.
63 FIFARMA, http://www.fifarma.org (last visited Mar. 31, 2014) (English transla-
tion available at  http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=http://
www.fifarma.org/&prev=/search%3Fq%3DFifarma%26client%3Dfirefox-a%26hs%
3Dvu6%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:enUS:official%26channel%3Dfflb).
64 IFPMA members must abide by the standards set forth in the IFPMA Code. For
a list of member organizations and their adoption of the IFPMA Code, see INT’L
FED’N OF PHARM. MFRS. & ASS’NS, IFPMA Code Compliance Network (CCN) Global
Code Comparison (2012), http://www.ifpma.org/fileadmin/content/Ethics/IFPMA_
Code_of_Practice/ifpma_global_code_051113_final.pdf.
65 Eduardo Pisani, Foreword to INT’L FED’N OF PHARM. MFRS. & ASS’NS, IFPMA
CODE OF PRACTICE (2012), http://www.ifpma.org/fileadmin/content/Publication/
2012/IFPMA_Code_of_Practice_2012 _new_logo.pdf. This last iteration garnered
much attention from the international compliance and corruption community, as it
took a great leap forward in specifically addressing the gray areas noted above. In
particular, the revision “clarif[ied] proper payments to healthcare professionals for
speaking, meetings, and other services; defin[ed] gifts and promotions as distinct
from ‘items of medical utility’ and require[ed] both to be modest in value; elimi-
nate[ed] mention of cultural courtesy gifts; and require[ed] medical samples to be
marked as such.” Earle & Cava, supra note 23, at 137. It is interesting to note that
a dozen years after the creation of the IFPMA, its British counterpart, the Associa-
tion of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI), established the Prescription
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industry associations of various Latin American countries, including:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and
Peru.66  Each of these trade associations is known by its own acronym
and provides information about the Code of Practice on its individual
website.67
In Brazil, two trade associations represent the large sector in
question: Abimed,68 the umbrella for technology and medical device
manufacturers, and Interfarma,69 which includes pharmaceutical
companies.  Both have adopted codes to govern the competitive envi-
ronment of their respective sector, which in many respects parallel
each other.
A close review of Interfarma’s Code of Practice reflects its aim
to establish high standards for the industry and to offer innovative
guidance for clean competition in a lucrative environment.  The Pref-
ace provides:
Medicines Code of Practice Authority (PMCPA) “to operate the Code of Practice for
the Pharmaceutical Industry independently of the [ABPI] itself.” ASSOC. OF THE
BRITISH PHARM. INDUS., CODE OF PRACTICE FOR THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 1,
2 (2012), http://www.breakthrough.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/About%20Us/
Our%20Supporters/Corporate%20Partners/ABPI_Code_2012.pdf.  In 2011, it, too,
took action to address the potential for corruption in the marketing of
pharmaceuticals and medical devices by specifying that gifts must be properly re-
lated to patient care and must be modest in nature. See Earle & Cava, supra note
23, at 135–37.
66 INT’L FED’N OF PHARM. MFRS. & ASS’NS, Members – Associations, http://www
.ifpma.org/about-ifpma/members/associations.html (last visited March 31, 2014).
67 The respective associations of each nation are: Argentina – Federacio´n Lati-
noamericana de la Industria Farmace´utica (FIFARMA) and Ca´mara Argentina de
Especialidades Medicinales (CAEMe); Brazil – Associac¸a˜o da Indu´stria
Farmaceˆutica de Pesquisa (Interfarma); Chile – Ca´mara de la Innovacio´n
Farmace´utica de Chile (CIF); Colombia – La Asociacio´n de Laboratorios
Farmace´uticos de Investigacio´n (AFIDRO); Ecuador – Industria Farmace´utica de
Investigacio´n e Innovacio´n (IFI); Guatemala – La Federacio´n Centroamericana de
Laboratorios Farmace´uticos (Fedefarma); Mexico – Asociacio´n Mexicana de Indus-
trias de Investigacio´n Farmace´utica, A.C (AMIIF); and Peru – Asociacio´n Nacional
de Laboratorios Farmace´uticos (ALAFARPE). Id.
68 See ABIMED, Code of Ethics (3d ed. 2010), available at http://www.abimed
.org.br/adimed_v4_online_ingles.pdf. Abimed (Associac¸a˜o Brasileira da Indu´stria
de Alta Tecnologia de Equipamentos, Produtos e Suprimentos Me´dico-Hospital-
ares) is the Brazilian Association of Industry and High Technology of Equipment.
See Rebeca Duran, Brazilian Medical Industry Overview, BRAZIL BUS., June 21,
2013, http://thebrazilbusiness.com/article/brazilian-medical-industry-overview.
69 INTERFARMA, CODE OF CONDUCT (2012), http://www.ifpma.org/fileadmin/content
/About%20us/2%20Members/Associations/Code-Brazil/Brazil_-_Interfarma_Code_
of_Conduct_2012_-_English_version.pdf.
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. . .For us at Interfarma, the Code of Conduct is more
than just a text. It is a document that governs our daily
practice and our greater commitment with society and
with the country: act ethically. Thus, only those compa-
nies that respect and follow the Code can become mem-
bers of our entity. And, in the event of noncompliance
with the rules, the Code itself establishes the mecha-
nisms that lead to punishment.
With this initiative, we hope to help patients, doctors,
authorities and professionals transform public health
and the relations that exist therein in our Country in ar-
eas of clarity, transparency, respect for laws and
ethics.70
The document is divided into four sections, each of which ad-
dresses in detail the following concerns: general rules, prescription
drugs, over-the-counter (OTC) drugs, and guidance for dispute resolu-
tion.71 Under its umbrella of general rules, Interfarma sets out ten
guidelines that cover industry relationships with public officials and
government agents and patient groups, specifically addressing long-
standing areas of concern with respect to corruption in the industry:
inappropriate support of physicians to attend or lecture at meetings
and lavish gifts intended influence purchasing decisions.
Accordingly, Interfarma’s Code limits a physician’s ability to
attend medical meetings at a pharmaceutical company’s expense.  Al-
though support for both national and international travel expenses,
meals, and hospitality is permitted, it “may not be conditional on the
prescription, distribution, and/or advertisement or promotion of any
kind of medicine.”72 Further, any support must be disclosed for lec-
tures or presentations, as well as any conflict of interest that might
exist, and gifts other than items directly related to medical services
and of minimal value are prohibited.73
70 Theo Van der Loo & Antoˆnio Britto, Preface to INTERFARMA, CODE OF CONDUCT,
supra note 69, at 3.
71 INTERFARMA, supra note 69, at 10.
72 Ester Flesch et al., Brazil, PROMOTING MEDICAL PRODS. GLOBALLY: HANDBOOK
OF PHARMA AND MEDTECH COMPLIANCE 1, 7 (3d ed. 2012), available at http://www.
bakermckenzie.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Global%20Pharmaceuticals/Brazil.
pdf.
73 Section 10.1 of the Code regarding The Offer of Gifts specifically provides:
The Companies bound to this Code of Conduct may offer gifts to
Healthcare Professionals, provided the all the following condi-
tions are complied with:
i) the gifts shall be objects related to medical practice and/or
strictly educational, such  as, but not limited to publications,
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Similar restrictions apply to the marketing of drugs to physi-
cians: incentives are forbidden, meals must be for educational pur-
poses only, and neither companions nor health care professionals who
are not licensed to prescribe may be offered hospitality.74 The final
chapter of the Code includes provisions for an independent Ethics
Committee as well as a list of penalties for violation of the rules, which
provide that fines shall be donated to selected non-profit entities.75
Abimed’s Code of Practice, an updated version of which was
promulgated in 2012, sets forth “four basic principles [to] serve as a
guide to . . . [the] Code of Ethics – Separation, Transparency, Equiva-
lence, and Documentation. . .”76 These specifically address the con-
cerns that permeate the industry:  the ability of health care
professionals working in their official capacity to affect purchasing de-
cisions; the need for all interactions with health care professionals to
be clearly documented; the notion that any support be in proportion to
the work done in exchange; and, finally, that all transactions be in
writing.77 Interestingly, in the very next paragraph following articula-
tion of its basic principles, the document specifically incorporates by
reference the requirements of the FCPA as it applies to its “associate
companies.”78
As noted above, Interfarma and Abimed are but two of a num-
ber of industry organizations operating in Latin America, but they
have earned a degree of respect for leadership in addressing the temp-
tations presented to those involved in the sale and purchase of
stand-alone issues of scientific periodicals (except subscriptions),
and anatomic models;
ii) the gifts shall be objects of a merely symbolic value, i.e., ob-
jects whose individual value is not higher than one third (1/3) of
the national minimum wage at the time of their acquisitions, and
may or may not have the Company’s logo; and
iii) the offers of gifts are limited to three (3) events per year for
each Healthcare Professional.
Section 10.2 provides:
Products used in the administrative routine of clinics, including,
but not limited to pens, pencil holders, and notepads shall not be
considered objects related to medical practice and, therefore,
shall not be distributed as gifts. The prohibition set forth in this
item does not include the offer of pens and notepads used as sup-
port material by participants in congresses, seminars or scien-
tific lectures held outside the medical clinic environment.
Id. at 27–28 (footnotes omitted).
74 Id. at 31–32.
75 Id. at 41–42.
76 See ABIMED, supra note 68, at 5–6.
77 Id. at 6.
78 Id.
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medicines and medical devices. Indeed, Interfarma in particular is
seen to be working closely with the government in drafting legislation
designed to promote its goals.79
B. Country Code
Brazil has been the focus of regional scrutiny with respect to its
evolving regulation of the pharmaceutical and medical device industry
as a whole. The regulatory scheme for the pharmaceutical industry is
complex. The federal government plays a role in establishing the right
to advertise and fairly compete,80 but with respect to the regulation
and marketing of drugs and medical devices, the government’s Minis-
try of Health is “responsible for public health in Brazil [and] oversees
Brazil’s national health system.81 The Ministry operates under a man-
agement contract with the National Health Surveillance Agency
(ANVISA), which is essentially independent and financially autono-
mous82 and is referred to as “Brazil’s FDA-equivalent.”83
ANVISA wields great power over the global pharmaceutical
and medical device companies under its jurisdiction.  In order to do
business in Brazil, a pharmaceutical firm must register all products,
which must also pass clinical tests within the country—even if the
79 In a recent interview, Edvard Philipson, Vice President of Ferring
Pharmaceuticals in Latin America, stated:
The industry association in Brazil, INTERFARMA, participates
very actively in developing [pharma industry] regulations and
ensuring their success. There are already very specific guidelines
on what type of promotional materials can be given to physi-
cians, the cost and size of samples provided, and so on. Brazil,
followed by Chile, Mexico and Columbia are at the forefront –
these are countries where the government is fundamentally the
payer, and has more of a say in how things are done. However
there are other countries where regulations there are not so
strict or so well-enforced – countries such as Bolivia, Peru, Vene-
zuela, even Argentina.
Ben Steele, Global Ethics Codes and the Latin American Pharma Market, EYE FOR
PHARMA, June 6, 2013, http://social.eyeforpharma.com/market-access/global-eth-
ics-codes-and-latin-american-pharma-market.
80 See Flesch et al, supra note 72, at 3–6.
81 Jennifer Bragg et al., Ensuring FCPA Compliance While Transacting Business
in Brazil, FDLI 8, 9 (May/June 2012), https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/
publications/Loucks_Bragg_ Ensuring%20FCPA_MayJune2012.pdf.
82 Id. at 10. (“Anvisa is responsible for regulating, controlling, and inspecting
products and services that have the potential to pose risks to public health. Among
other things, Anvisa monitors and regulates drugs, medical devices and controls,
and smoking products, and provides technical support in the grant of patents.”).
83 Id.
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United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved it.84
In addition, “a foreign company seeking to market a pharmaceutical
product must have a domestic partner, given the Latin American busi-
ness culture’s reliance on personal relationships.”85
Further, since its creation in 1999, ANVISA “has increased the
level of surveillance in the sector,”86 issuing a number of regulations,
known as rulings, that address concerns surrounding corruption and
compliance in the pharmaceutical industry.  For example, in June of
2009, ANIVISA issued Resolution RDC 96/08, which imposed signifi-
cantly more restrictions on advertisements for medicine and drugs
than did its earlier standard.87  Although these only apply to the pro-
motion of pharmaceuticals to private practice physicians, they set a
best practices standard for the entire healthcare industry.88
Resolution 96/08 addresses gifts to physicians who can pre-
scribe medications89 as well as hospitality and entertainment for
healthcare professionals to attend educational conferences,90 “but does
not provide the level of education and entertainment that is considered
acceptable.”91 The resolution also addresses other areas of concern in
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 See Flesch et al, supra note 72, at 3.
87 Id. at 5. Note that the General Attorney of the Brazilian Government has ques-
tioned the validity of these restrictions on jurisdictional grounds, which ANVISA
has ignored. Id.
88 Id. at 6.  It is important to note that
the rules outlined below are applicable to private practice doctors
only, as dealings with governmental officials involve another set
of regulations. However, the issue of a physician’s possible public
function is a broad concept which is not fully defined in Brazilian
law. The main consideration is that a physician who works for a
governmental or a public funded entity should not have any deci-
sion-making powers. This includes holding administrative/mana-
gerial functions within the institution or participating in the
elaboration of technical specifications for public bids/tenders. Id.
89 Id. at 7.  ANVISA Resolution RDC 96/08, Article 5 provides that pharmaceuti-
cal companies cannot offer gifts, benefits or anything else of value to physicians
who can prescribe medicines, whether or not the intent was quid pro quo. “How-
ever, low-value gifts (pens, notebooks, etc.) are still authorized. Prescription pads
cannot contain the company logo or promote a drug. Materials containing scientific
information such as magazines and medical journals can be freely distributed.” Id.
90 Id at 7–8.  As seems to be the emerging custom, travel support to educational
opportunities is permitted by Brazilian law, but it must be free of any conditions
and any relationship between the healthcare provider and the company must be
disclosed in all appropriate ways. Further, the conference must be genuinely edu-
cational in nature, not a subterfuge for luxury travel.
91 Id. at 8.
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the global enforcement environment, including off-label promotion of
drugs, distribution of free samples, and comparison advertising.92
Note that ANVISA has both civil and criminal sanctions at its
disposal and it has increased its enforcement activity in the past five
years, imposing four times the amount of money in fines between 2008
and 2010.93 Obviously, it is difficult to explore the full dimensions of
the legal landscape governing pharmaceutical and medical devices
promotion and sales in Brazil,94 but suffice it to say that the issue has
been the topic of no less than eighteen educational conferences be-
tween January, 2012 and March, 2014.95  No doubt this is in large
measure due to the reality of the marketplace, which is rife with
temptation.
C. Reality
Today, with its robust economy, Brazil is a very attractive
place to do business. In 2012, it ranked as the top recipient of foreign
direct investment in Latin America, receiving $65.272 billion in for-
eign investment in 2012 alone.96 It is the world’s ninth largest market
for pharmaceuticals and drugs, worth nearly $15.5 billion.97 Estimates
for 2014 place that number at closer to $25 billion annually.98 A sur-
vey of managers in the pharmaceutical and healthcare sectors sug-
92 Id. at 8–9.  These topics are interesting, but outside the corruption under con-
sideration in this article.
93 Id. at 11.
94 Unofficial translations of ANVISA regulations are offered on the Brazil Pharma
News website. Juliane Carvalho, English Translated Regulations, BRAZIL PHARMA
NEWS (Jan. 11, 2014 3:42 PM), http://www.brazilpharmanews.com/regulatory-up
dates/translated-regulations.html.
95 See, e.g., FDLI, The Food and Drug Law Institute’s U.S. & Brazil: Navigating
New Frontiers in Pharmaceutical, Medical Device and Food Law and Regulation,
http://www.fdli.org/conferences/conference-pages/u-s-brazil-navigating-new-fron-
tiers-in-pharmaceutical-medical-device-and-food-law-and-regulation (conference
held Sep. 10–11, 2012 in Sa˜o Paulo, Brazil). For the complete list of such confer-
ences in Brazil, see Juliane Carvalho, Conferences, BRAZIL PHARMA NEWS (Apr. 23,
2012 10:31 AM), http://www.brazilpharmanews.com/conferences.html.
96 ECON. COMM’N FOR LATIN AM. & THE CARIBBEAN, Foreign Direct Investment in
Latin America and the Caribbean, 1, 26 (2013), http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/
xml/4/49844/ForeignDirectInvestment2012.pdf.
97 Bragg et al, supra note 81, at 8–9.
98 Keith M. Korenchuk et al., Responding to Anti-Corruption Concerns in Brazil:
Considerations for the Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Sectors, PHARM. COM-
PLIANCE MONITOR (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.pharmacompliancemonitor.com/res
ponding-to-anti-corruption-concerns-in-brazil-considerations-for-the-pharmaceuti
cal-and-medical-device-sectors/6069.
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gests that Brazil is the favored emerging market for 2012-2017 by a
wide margin.99
At the same time, the 2013 Transparency International Cor-
ruption Index ranked Brazil 72nd out of 177 countries and territories
surveyed,100 underlining an environment where the potential for
abuse threads throughout the healthcare system. There is general
agreement that with increased investments in emerging markets
comes increased risk of corruption. According to Robert Barrington,
TI’s Director of External Affairs, “[t]here are a number of classic red
flags for bribery that indicate the pharma sector is particularly vulner-
able . . . . These include a tradition of gifts and hospitality, a lack of
transparency in pricing and the need for regulatory approval in
everything.”101
One area of concern is the process in place for purchasing medi-
cal goods and services for the government’s healthcare system. In Bra-
zil, private entities submit bids in a public procurement mechanism
that is not centralized in a single national entity, so federal, state, and
municipal authorities organize tenders,102 or requests for proposals.
The system involves multiple points of access to decision makers,
which leads to serious corruption risk because would-be bribers can
use multiple avenues to encourage or influence corrupt conduct of deci-
sion makers, including health authorities responsible for budgets or
procurement decisions.103 Another area of concern is, of course, any
interaction with health care providers who might influence the choice
of products and devices for the system.104 These realities, coupled to-
gether with general perceptions of corruption in the country,105 no
doubt provided the basis for the decision of the Brazilian government
to take dramatic action.
99 Pharmaceuticals and Healthcare Companies Face Tougher Times in Emerging
Markets, GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.globalintel-
ligence.com/insights/all/pharmaceuticals-and-healthcare-companies-face-tougher-
times-in-emerging-markets.
100 Corruption Perception Index 2013, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://cpi.transparen
cy.org/cpi2013 /results (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
101 Aleksandar Vasovic & Ben Hirschler, A Prescription for Corruption, REUTERS,
4 (Feb. 28, 2012), http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/specials/Pharma.pdf.
102 The tender process is a complex undertaking that requires its own analysis.
See, e.g., MGMT. SCIS. FOR HEALTH, MDS-3: MANAGING ACCESS TO MEDICINES AND
HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES (2014),CH. 21, AT 21.24, available at http://www.msh.org/
sites/msh.org/files/mds3-jan2014.pdf.
103 Korenchuk et al., supra note 98.
104 Id.
105 See generally Stuart Vincent Campbell, Note, Perception is Not Reality: The
FCPA, Brazil, and the Mismanagement of Corruption, 22 MINN. J. INTL. LAW 247
(2013).
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IV. BRAZIL’S CLEAN COMPANIES ACT
A. Analysis
The sheer scale of preparing for both the soccer (known as foot-
ball outside of the United Stated of America) World Cup in 2014 and
the Summer Olympics in 2016 may have alerted the Brazilian legisla-
tors that “business as usual” would not be an appropriate way to show-
case the country to the world audience.106 No doubt this sentiment
was highlighted by the events of the 2013 “Brazil Spring” when an
increase in bus fares drove protesters to the streets, where they tapped
into deep discontent about the country’s economy and its massive
spending to prepare for both events.107 Brazil’s history of corruption is
legendary; recent examples include the Siemens case,108 the incarcera-
tion of officials from the “Mensalao” prosecutions,109 the Bridgestone
106 Shasta Darlington & Sarah Holt, “No Stadium, No Match-FIFA Issues Threat
to Brazil World Cup City, Jan. 22, 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/21/sport /
football / football-world-cup-venue-threat / (discussing problem of pace of
construction).
107 Girish Gupta, Brazil’s Protests: Social Inequality and World Cup Spending
Fuel Mass Unrest, TIME (June 18, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/06/18/brazils-
protests-social-inequality-and-world-cup-spending-fuel-mass-unrest/ (noting that
“[protestors] decry a culture marked by corruption, a general lack of return on
high taxes, and point to inadequate government upkeep and spending on infra-
structure, education and healthcare.”); see also Brazil’s New Anti-Bribery Act Goes
into Effect in January 2014—Is Your Company Ready? BLANK ROME LLP (Dec.
2013), https://www.blankrome.com /index.cfm?contentID=37&itemID=3224 [here-
inafter Brazil’s New Anti Bribery Act] (“Commentators have noted that the Brazil-
ian Congress finally passed the Act in response to widespread protests against
official corruption and government spending in connection with the 2014 FIFA
World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, both of which will be held in Brazil.”). But see,
Jones Day & Mattos Nuriel Kestener Advogados, Brazil’s Clean Company Law:
New Risks for Companies Doing Business in Brazil, JONES DAY 1 (Aug. 2013),
available at  http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/3c9b0192-a812-4849-b9fb-
96fc1e520f70/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ec9bf444-80c0-4892-af4a-9731
b3d3c57c/Brazil%20Clean%20Company%20Law.pdf (noting that “[t]he adoption of
the Law caps a three-year process that mostly predates the recent public outcry
against corruption” and likening it to the OECD compliance issue).
108 Alex Webb & Christiana Sciaudone, Siemens Banned From Bidding in Brazil
on Suspected Bribery, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2014-02-28/siemens-banned-from-bidding-in-brazil-on-suspected-bribery
.html.
109 Ex-Government Leaders Begin Prison Terms in Brazilian Corruption Case,
UPI (Nov. 16, 2013, 11:34 AM), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/
11/16/Ex-government-leaders-begin-prison-terms-in-Brazilian-corruption-case/
UPI-75421384619678 [hereinafter Ex-Government Leaders]; see also Jones Day &
Mattos Nuriel Kestener Advogados, supra note 107, at 2.
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investigations and plea,110 and the Brazilian subsidiary of Eli Lilly
pharmaceutical’s problems with bribery involving the sale of drugs.111
In November 2013, the first Brazilian officials convicted in the “Men-
salao” or “big monthly allowance” scheme started serving their jail
sentences.112 This fact alone sends an alert to the business community
– punishment for common corruption, once thought to be impossible,
was in fact imposed. A several million dollar fine, which amounts to a
mere slap on the wrist in many situations, may be considered an ac-
ceptable cost of doing business, but incarceration along with even
larger fines will begin to deter criminal behavior.
The Brazilian Clean Companies Act was passed August 1, 2013
and became effective January 29, 2014.113 The law is divided into
seven chapters. Initially, the law provides for “strict administrative
and civil liability of a legal person for engaging in acts against the pub-
lic administration, national or foreign.”114 It applies to “companies . . .
with personhood or not, regardless of the form.”115 The law does not
preclude individuals’ liability as well. The definition of what is prohib-
ited mirrors the FCPA by making it illegal “[t]o promote, offer, or give,
directly or indirectly, an improper benefit to a public agent or to a
third person related to him.”116 Interestingly, the law also outlaws
“sponsoring” the illegal acts of or “hid[ing] or cover[ing] up” the “real
110 In 2011, Bridgestone agreed to pay $28 million to the DOJ for “violating the
FCPA through bid rigging and corrupt payments to government officials in a num-
ber of countries, including Brazil.” Brazil’s New Anti-Bribery Act, supra note 107,
n. 3; see also Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Bridgestone Corporation Agrees to
Plead Guilty to Participating in Conspiracies to Rig Bids and Bribe Foreign Gov-
ernment Officials (Sept. 15, 2011), available at www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/
September/11-crm-1193.html.
111 See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Eli Lilly and Company with FCPA Vio-
lations (Dec. 20, 2012), available at www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/Press-
Release/1365171487116; Brazil’s New Anti-Bribery Act, supra note 108, n. 3;
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 2013 Mid-year Update, BAKERHOSTETLER 27 (2013),
http://www.bakerlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/FCPA/2013FCPAMidYearUp
date.pdf (discussing SEC settlement in December 2012 in “Russian, Polish, Chi-
nese, and Brazilian operations for $29.4 million, including $14 million in disgorged
profits.”); Richard L. Cassin, A Survey of FCPA Sentences, FCPA BLOG (Feb. 28,
2012 5:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/2/28/a-survey-of-fcpa-sentences
.html (discussing the variance in sentences with 15 years the longest).
112 Ex-Government Leaders, supra note 109 (discussing the Supreme Court order-
ing twelve men to begin serving sentences immediately, including former Presi-
dent Lula Da Silva’s former chief of staff).
113 Law No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIA´RIO OFICIAL DA UNIA˜O [D.O.U.] de
7.8.2013 (Braz.).
114 Id., ch. I, art. 1.
115 Id.
116 Id.
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interests or the identities of the beneficiaries.”117 The Clean Compa-
nies Act specifies that engaging in fraud in the public bid process or
hindering investigations would also violate the law.118 It also extends
a very broad definition of “public agent” and can include someone who
is not paid.119 What this means, however, has yet to be determined.
Rather than requiring criminal intent, the new Act states that
“the legal persons shall be held strictly liable . . . for the injurious acts
stipulated herein.”120 This may be akin to the earlier version of the
FCPA, which had the “reason to know” standard rather than the
“knowing” standard.121 Note, however, that Brazil’s position seems to
run counter to the trend reflected in the more recent UKBA, which
allows an “adequate procedures defense.”122 Perhaps Brazil’s first step
reflects an effort to enact tough legislation, but in reality what may be
needed instead is an articulated bright line that has clear, consistent
consequences once crossed.
Liability, set out in Chapter III, “shall include a fine of from
.1% to 20% of gross billings of the fiscal year prior . . . which shall
never be less than the benefit gained . . .”123 If gross billings cannot be
estimated, the fine should be from R$6,000 to R$60,000,000.124 The
factors considered include the seriousness of the offense, the benefit
gained, negative effects, the position of the violator, cooperation, and
the existence of an international compliance program.125
Chapter IV highlights the “Administrative Proceeding for Lia-
bility,” which surprisingly allows many agencies to take control of
these proceedings, noting, “[t]he institution and judgment of an ad-
ministrative proceeding to ascertain the liability of a legal person ap-
pertains to the supreme authority of each body or entity of the
Executive, Legislative and judicial branches . . .”126 Each authority
shall have a committee by “[two] or more permanent civil servants.”127
This is the most serious defect in the law: a system of myriad commit-
tees with many different quasi-judges reduces accountability while in-
creasing the potential to use accusations in and of themselves as a
117 Id., ch. II, art. 5.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id., ch. I, art. 2.
121 See Shearman & Sterling, supra note 3; OECD, supra note 4.
122 See Law No. 12,846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIA´RIO OFICIAL DA UNIA˜O [D.O.U.]
de 7.8.2013 (Braz.).
123 Id., ch. III, art. 6.
124 Id.
125 Id. at ch. III, art. 7.
126 Id. at ch. IV, art. 8.
127 Id. at ch. IV, art. 10.
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means of shakedown. The Comptroller General handles matters deal-
ing with a “foreign public administration.”128
Chapter V, “Leniency Agreement,” officially recognizes the ben-
efits of cooperating with the investigation.129 This is akin to non-prose-
cution agreements that have been used so effectively in the United
States.130
Chapter VI, “Judicial Liability,” notes that even if the entity is
found liable, it could face additional penalties, including “suspension
or partial prohibition of its operations” or “compulsory dissolution of
the legal person.”131 Further, there may be “freezing of assets,”132 al-
though nothing explains what this means or how it will apply.  Unlike
the possibility of using the British Serious Fraud Office’s budget as an
indicator of enforcement intent,133 Brazil’s decentralized investigation
and prosecution process makes it impossible to view funds allocated
for these procedures as a proxy for the seriousness of Brazil’s plans for
enforcement.
Chapter VII, “Final Provisions,” announces the National Regis-
try of Punished Companies, which will publish penalties imposed by
all branches of government.134 The Registry will also publish Leniency
Agreements. This measure demonstrates cognizance of the problem of
decentralized enforcement and offers a way to centralize reporting,
thereby partially curing the defect; however, the Registry’s effective-
ness remains to be seen.
There are interesting comparisons to be made with the FCPA,
U.K. Bribery Act, and the Brazilian Clean Companies Act. Many law
firms have issued advisories to their clients on how to comply with this
128 Id. at ch. IV, art. 9.
129 Id. at ch. V, art. 16.
130 See GIBSON DUNN, 2013 Mid-Year Update on Corporate Deferred Prosecution
Agreements(DPAs)and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) 1, 1(2013), http://www
.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2013-Mid-Year-Update-Corporate-De
ferred-Prosecution-Agreements-and-Non-Prosecution-Agreements.pdf (comparing
the use of deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecutions agreements in
the US with recent developments in the UK regarding their approach to such
agreements).
131 Law No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIA´RIO OFICIAL DA UNIA˜O [D.O.U.] de
7.8.2013 (Braz.), at  ch. VI, art. 19.
132 Id.
133 Matt Kelly, The Delicate State of Anti-Bribery Enforcement at the SFO, COM-
PLIANCE WEEK (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.complianceweek.com/the-delicate-
state-of-anti-bribery-enforcement-at-the-sfo/article/338487/, (discussing the prob-
lem of underfunding).
134 Law No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIA´RIO OFICIAL DA UNIA˜O [D.O.U.] de
7.8.2013 (Braz.), at ch. VII, art. 22.
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new regulatory effort.135 One cannot overstate the importance of Bra-
zil’s first step, particularly in the context of the significant financial
outlays for the World Cup and the Olympics. This is an important and
laudable initial attempt to level the playing fields for the countries’
whose companies do not fall within the reach of the FCPA or the U.K.
Bribery Act. For example, Chinese companies that do not have a pres-
ence in the U.K. or U.S. will begin to feel the potential consequence of
this law. This is significant because companies from countries that
could ignore external constraints up to now may become ensnared in
embarrassing prosecutions.
There is no criminal liability for entities, which is an important
distinction. Yet, theoretically, the company could be barred or could
also be dissolved, which—if used—is a powerful incentive to adopt ap-
propriate business practices.
Similar to the U.K. Bribery Act, Brazil’s law does not permit
the facilitation exception that exists in the FCPA, however, it is not
clear how this will be enforced. If everything is a violation of the law,
then companies may find it easier to ignore.  The experience of the
United States is perhaps instructive:  Congress amended the FCPA to
allow facilitation payments for “routine government action.”136  In so
doing, it addressed the realities of business by drawing a clearer line
between what was de minimis and necessary to accomplish things in
certain environments and what was corrupt and unlawful. Perhaps
Brazil will see a revision is eventually necessary.
B. Commentary
The passage of the Clean Companies Act ushers in a new era of
possible change in the Brazilian business climate. As one commentator
highlighted, between 2001 and 2013, at which time Brazil ratified the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, there was only one prosecution for
bribery of foreign public officials.137 However, during this time, the po-
lice “conducted 289 domestic bribery investigations . . . resulting in
135 See, e.g., JONES DAY, supra note 107; Brazil’s New Anti-Bribery Act, supra note
107; Brazil’s Anti-corruption “Clean Company Law” Goes into Effect 1/24/14 – Get
Ready to Comply, DLA PIPER (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/in-
sights/publications/2013/08/brazils-anticorruption-clean-company-law-goes-in__/.
136 International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105–366,
Nov. 10, 1998, 112 Stat 3302 (amending Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
137 COVINGTON AND BURLING, Advisory – Anti-Corruption: New Brazilian Anti-
Bribery Statute 1, 3 (2013), http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/83260639-b097-
4908-843c-1434efafca9e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/8c7a9c35-5f0c-4e2f-
9e12-168b79085722/New_Brazilian_Anti-Bribery_Statute.pdf (analyzing the stat-
ute and suggesting that companies need to develop policies and procedures to deal
with both domestic and foreign bribery).
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1,600 arrests – including the arrest of more than 100 public
officials.”138
Regulations are expected to be promulgated, but have not as of
this writing.
What is not in the law is interesting as well. One commentator
has focused not on the law’s provisions, but rather on the three sec-
tions of the law vetoed by President Rousseff.139 One removed a lower
ceiling on company fines, and another addressed factoring conduct of
public official and the last required proof of willful misconduct.140 The
impact of these vetoes made the law more stringent,141 yet one of the
parts that weakened the law—the diffused enforcement—was not
addressed.
The risk of multijurisdictional action is highlighted.142 For ex-
ample, commentator Gwendolyn Hassan notes four trends that are
changing the playing field: 1) more stringent (compared to the FCPA)
new national laws; 2) updates and strengthening of existing laws; 3)
new enforcement efforts (citing Canada, Korea, Switzerland, and Alge-
ria); and 4) increasing cross border dual prosecutions thereby increas-
ing potential penalties.143 This is in the international context of the G-
20 adopting “The Guiding Principles on Enforcement of the Foreign
Bribery Offense” and “Guiding Principles to Combat Solicitation” in
the fall of 2013144 and also issuing a related Declaration.145 Heather
Lowe, legal counsel of Global Financial Integrity, noted:
138 Id. at 3, n. 9.
139 JONES DAY, supra note 107, at 4.
140 Id.
141 Accord. SCHUMPETER, Brazil’s New Anti-Corruption Law: Hard to Read, ECON-
OMIST (Jan. 29, 2014, 9:40 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2014/
01/brazil-s-new-anti-corruption-law (but noting that how the regulations are im-
plemented will make a great difference and highlighting the problem of decentral-
ized enforcement).
142 Gwendolyn L. Hassan, The Increasing Risk of Multijurisdictional Bribery Pros-
ecution: Why Having an FCPA Compliance Program Is No Longer Enough, 42
INT’L L. NEWS, no. 1, Winter 2013, available at http://www.americanbar.org/
publications/international_law_news/2013/winter/the_increasing_risk_multijuris
dictional_bribery_prosecution_why_having_fcpa_compliance_program_no_longer_
enough.html (noting that although enforcement actions have slowed in the US,
there is a “marked increase” in enforcement actions in other jurisdiction).
143 Id.
144 G20 ANTI-CORRUPTION WORKING GROUP, Progress Report 2013, (2013), http://
www.mofa.go.jp/files/000014208.pdf (report from meeting in Russia).
145 G20 Leaders’ Declaration, (2013), http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000013493.pdf
(agreeing to share tax information by the end of 2015 and help deny corrupt indi-
viduals a place to hide); see also Samuel Rubenfeld, G-20 Adopts Foreign Bribery
Enforcement Principles, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2013, 4:41 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
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Four or five years ago, the idea of automatically exchang-
ing tax information wasn’t even on the table. . . . Now the
20 largest economies in the world have announced that
they will begin sharing information automatically within
two to three years. This is really a sea change.146
While this is a significant change, the implementation will
have to be watched.  Ironically, although Russia exerted significant
leadership in the 2013 G-20 process in anticipation of the 2014 Winter
Olympics in Sochi in 2014, it exerted brute force in annexing Crimea
in March of 2014 and has been shunned by the community of nations.
Accordingly, it is certain that Russia will not be leading this effort and
may not even participate in it.147 Obviously, it will be an ongoing prob-
lem if Russian companies continue to bribe with impunity in their
home country, and Russia is a safe haven for corrupt officials and their
booty. Indeed, Russia has offered a safe haven to the ousted leader of
the Ukraine, Victor Yanukovich, whose extensive corruption is evident
from his opulent home and galleon-shaped banquet hall—collectively
referred to as “the museum of corruption.”148 These developments are
deeply troubling and will no doubt set back Russia’s efforts to address
corruption, however minimal those measures have been.
As Transparency International has made clear with its Bribe
Payers Index, if offering the bribe continues, the corruption cycle
keeps moving. If countries simultaneously crack down on corruption, it
will dry up both the offers and the offerees. So, if Chinese companies
become concerned, then that could be significant change. If Russia is
no longer an active member of the G-7 or G-20, and there is a Euro-
pean-Russian split brought on by the tension in Ukraine and the an-
nexation of Crimea, there will be a ripple effect all over the world,
including Brazil, in terms of progress on international and national
anti-corruption measures.
riskandcompliance/2013/09/09/g-20-adopts-foreign-bribery-enforcement-principles
(summarizing impact of G-20 meetings).
146 Rubenfeld, supra note 145.
147 Cf. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERV., CORRUPTION IN RUSSIA 1
(2014), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2014/1407
42/LDM_BRI%282014%29140742_REV1_EN.pdf (discussing the extent of corrup-
tion in Russia as compared to other G-20 nations).
148 Roland Oliphant, Viktor Yanukovych Leaves Behind Palace Monument to
Greed and Corruption, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10657109/Viktor-Yanukovych-leaves-behind-pal-
ace-monument-to-greed-and-corruption.html (describing the lavish mansion de-
posed Ukraine leader left when he fled to Russia).
35295-rgl_13-3 Sheet No. 18 Side A      09/09/2014   14:33:00
35295-rgl_13-3 Sheet No. 18 Side A      09/09/2014   14:33:00
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\13-3\RGL301.txt unknown Seq: 27 27-AUG-14 13:23
2014] UNITED STATES’ FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 465
C. Impact
Companies will have to be prepared for enforcement efforts in
Brazil. Whether they materialize is another question. Companies will
need a compliance program that is thought out beyond just compliance
with the FCPA, because as the earlier sections illustrated, that will
not be sufficient. One Brazilian compliance consultant commented,
“[G]iven the lack of enforcement to date, coupled with the high levels
of bureaucracy, Brazil presents a high level of compliance risk for most
companies.”149
The replacement enforcer for Lanny Breuer in the United
States Department of Justice, Associate Attorney General, Mythili
Raman, noted the SEC was using Nonprosecution Agreements in an
FCPA case.150 Furthermore, parallel prosecution will have a dramatic
impact:
[A]nother major trend in FCPA enforcement is the use of
parallel or “carbon copy” prosecutions. With many coun-
tries passing their own anti-bribery statutes or choosing
to aggressively enforce statutes already on the books,
multi-national corporations are increasingly required to
navigate and interact with multiple regulatory regimes
while conducting business abroad. When companies vio-
late these laws they face prosecution by multiple coun-
tries for the same set of alleged bad acts. Moreover,
where one country begins an investigation into alleged
bribery, this investigation may in and of itself catalyze
other countries’ investigations or the commencement of
their legal proceedings against the company.151
How this will translate into numbers of investigations and convictions
for corruption and bribery in Brazil or in other countries for activities
in Brazil will have to be watched carefully in 2014 and 2015.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
Pharmaceutical companies no doubt have their collective eye
on Brazil, welcoming this new Clean Companies Act with a mixture of
anxiety and relief.  On the one hand, the multinational entities have
long participated in local, regional, and global efforts to self-regulate,
thereby meeting and even exceeding the long-standing requirements
of the FCPA.  More recently, compliance officers have devoted serious
149 Gabriela Roitburd, Brazil’s Clean Companies Act – Executing, ASS’N. CORP.
COUNSEL (2013), http://www.acc.com/accdocket/onlineexclusives/brazil-cca-03.cfm.
150 BAKERHOSTETLER, supra note 111, at 1.
151 Id. at 2.
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attention to the stricter UKBA, particularly with its reach to purely
private business entities and its zero-tolerance for facilitation
payments.
Always mindful of these rules, multinational pharmaceutical
companies have had to compete with local and international firms not
necessarily willing to be subject to them.  Accordingly, despite Brazil’s
having embraced the standards of the IFPMA,152 which promotes best
practices in the pharmaceutical industry globally, their efforts to do
business in Brazil have been hampered. No doubt this national effort
to level the business playing field is welcome.
Nonetheless, the threat of large fines and imprisonment cer-
tainly is a harbinger of a more difficult business environment on the
ground in Brazil.  Just as the pace of anti-bribery enforcement in the
United States has quickened and has seemingly targeted the pharma-
ceutical sector,153 the same might well prove to be true for the indus-
try in Brazil.  A sea change is evident by the mere signing of this Act
into law.  It is not surprising that a cottage industry of another sort
has arisen to assist in navigating this unexpectedly new and poten-
tially turbulent environment: the plethora of conferences addressing
doing business in Brazil, especially geared to pharmaceutical compli-
ance, is remarkable.154
It is early for suggestions for modification of the Clean Compa-
nies Act, yet it is important to begin the discussion.  To wait eleven
years, as was the case in modifying the FCPA, would be too long in this
internet-connected global world of the twenty-first century.155
The first obvious priority necessary to improve the new anti-
corruption law in Brazil would be to empower a central enforcement
agency comparable to the Department of Justice or the Serious Fraud
Office with both authority and necessary funding. There can be no se-
rious enforcement otherwise. It goes without saying that to have a
“strict liability” statute with no central enforcement makes little
152 See supra, notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
153 Mike Scarcella, DOJ Targets Pharmaceutical Industry for FCPA Enforcement,
THE BLT: BLOG OF LEGALTIMES (Nov. 12, 2009 2:01 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad
.com/blt/2009/11/doj-targets-pharmaceutical-industry-for-fcpa-enforcement.html
(noting “focus more criminal enforcement” on pharma Assistant Attorney General
Breuer stated).
154 See supra, note 94 and accompanying text.
155 The FCPA was enacted in 1977 and substantially amended in 1988. If the
Clean Companies Law were to follow a similar timeline, revisions would not occur
until 2024. For a discussion on how globalization and the advent of the “network
society” in the modern era drive social change at an accelerated pace, see Brian M.
Stewart, Chronolawgy: A Study of Law and Temporal Perception, 67 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 303, 309–15 (2012).
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sense.156 Just as the ramped up enforcement in the United States has
put the FCPA in a new light, so would a robust focus by enforcement
authorities in Brazil accomplish much in a short time.
Second, Brazil must build upon the self-regulatory standards of
the IFPMA, Interfarma, and Abimed and enhance the regulatory
framework of ANVISA with respect to the embedded culture of estab-
lishing business relationships through meals and hospitality, travel,
and promotional gifts. Although the multinationals subject to the
FCPA and UKBA regulatory requirements have embraced the best
practices outlined above, it is most doubtful that international busi-
nesses not so constrained have paid much attention to them. Needless
to say, the same is likely true of local companies.  Accordingly, the
Clean Companies Act must more clearly define the proper amount and
type of meals, hospitality, travel, and gifts. The pharmaceutical indus-
try is mindful of the power of such incentives to affect business deci-
sion-making, and amplification of the proper limits would go a long
way to establishing a strong foundation for acceptance of the new Act
in the country.  Obvious examples to consider in offering guidance in-
clude:  What kind of meals may be offered for physicians? May there be
entertainment? How far may physicians, who are often state employ-
ees, travel for such education? Is a trip to Buenos Aires appropriate?
Miami?  California?
Third, focusing on the pharmaceutical industry but keeping in
mind that it serves as a template for other government purchasing ar-
rangements, Brazil’s decentralized approach to the tender system is
problematic.157 Although this may reflect deeply ingrained local senti-
ments—and, as outsiders, our recommendations will no doubt be dis-
counted—this presents serious opportunities for graft. Economies of
scale will never occur without a more comprehensive analysis and
overhaul of the bidding process in the medical and pharmaceutical sec-
tors as a precursor to truly imposing a Clean Companies presence in
Brazil.
Finally, modifying the “strict liability” approach to enforce-
ment by adopting a measure similar to the UKBA’s “adequate proce-
dures” approach, de facto mirrored in enforcement of the FCPA, seems
to reduce the invitation to “cooperate” with Brazilian authorities in an
improper way.  Although such cooperation, together with having “ef-
fective internal compliance procedures” and being willing to self-dis-
close, is recognized as a possible way to mitigate the large fines,158 one
156 Law No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIA´RIO OFICIAL DA UNIA˜O [D.O.U.] de
7.8.2013 (Braz.) ch. I, arts. 1st, 2d (providing for strict liability).
157 See supra, note 101 and accompanying text.
158 Kevin M. LaCroix, The Brazilian Clean Companies Act, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL
NEWSROOM (Dec. 11, 2013 3:20 PM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/
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must be wary of any invitation to cooperate with authorities in Brazil.
A more flexible hand is likely to wield a less open invitation to find
unauthorized ways to cooperate.
VI. CONCLUSION
Change is possible. One need only examine the startling
figures of the enforcement of the FCPA in the last ten years to see the
extraordinary growth in the fines and punishment of corporations and
individuals.159 While it may seem that the enforcement structure in
Brazil will never change, we have seen that it too is possible. The phar-
maceutical industry’s voluntary efforts will never be effective, how-
ever, unless there is the accompanying pressure of serious
enforcement with respect to all who do business in Brazil. The U.K.
and the United States’ enforcement of their respective national laws
will never rein in the behavior of Russian, Chinese, or other nations’
firms if they do not face legal accountability in their home nation. Hav-
ing said that, the fact remains that Brazil’s action in 2014—with its
showcase of the upcoming World Cup and Olympics—will help move
the anti-bribery agenda forward in a global context.
corporate/b/fcpa-compliance/archive/2013/12/11/the-brazilian-clean-companies-
act.aspx.
159 SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA Digest of Cases and Review Releases Relat-
ing to Bribes to Foreign Officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977,
1–671 (2014), http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/Services/FCPA/2014/Janu
ary_2014_FCPA_DigestFCPA010614.pdf (displaying one of the most comprehen-
sive up-to-date analyses, edited by former DOJ official Philip Urofsky).
